Literlature and Education

Japan 's Immigration  Law has a lot of correspondence on the spot, so I think that it often happens that the national interest is damaged. I suggested to respect the national interests first, like in Australia, into the Immigration Law and then propose how to change each individual VISA. English version which pubsilshed in Japanese.

In order to vindicate the causality of the mental, the three principles "distinctness of the mental from the physical," "physical closure of causality," and "causal relevance of the mental" must hold coherently. However, one of the problems of mental causation is that these three principles contradict each other. According to David Robb, these principles can be reconciled by adopting the "trope theory" of property. The trope theory regards properties as "abstract particulars," and according to Robb, mental and physical properties differ in types, but mental tropes are identical with physical tropes. Mental properties as tropes can have causal relevance to physical events in virtue of this trope identity. Cynthia and Graham Macdonald criticize Robb's view by demonstrating that the question "why mental property qua mental can cause anything" ("qua" problem) cannot be answered by investigating the nature of tropes. In addition to Macdonalds' criticism, I show another kind of difficulty in applying trope theory to mental causation. Since tropes are the particulars, trope theory is incompatible with our conception of causal explanation, which is essentially general.

We often have irrational beliefs which are not coherent with the others. If they could be explained under "The Principle of Charity", they would no longer be regarded as irrational. How can we explain irrational beliefs as such and give their place in the system of our beliefs? Donald Davidson proposed "the partitioning of mind" as the answer to this question, but his solution is hopeless because it seems to be inconsistent with holism. I propose the idea of Motivated Irrationality as an explanatory strategy of irrationality, because I think it can explain irrationality more simply than the mental partitioning and give the way out of the paradox of irrationality.

""It is thought that the problem of self-deception is difficult
to treat because it includes a paradox. I investigate under what
conditions self-deception occurs, rather than how the paradox
is solved. I think one of the important conditions of selfdeception
is that the two apparently contradicting beliefs
coexist without either of them being unconscious. After surveying
the discussions concerning whether self-deception is
intentional, I focus on the role of "motivation", following Alfred
Mele, and try to state the necessary and sufficient conditions
of self-deception on the basis of the motivations and situations
of the self-deceivers.""

"Higher-level (mental, sociological and biological, etc.) entities
are said to be supervenient on more basic, lower-level
(physical, micro-level) entities, and there is a view that lowerlevel
theories can completely and sufficiently explain higherlevel
events. But Harold Kincaid criticizes such a view. He
does not deny that lower-level theories do explain something,
but argues that they are only partial and incomplete, because
they cannot refer to higher-level kinds which supervene on
the relevant lower-level entities and answer important questions
about causal laws. I will argue that the completeness or
sufficiency of explanation is often evaluated interest-relatively,
and, against Kincaid, that higher-level explanation cannot be
sufficient without mentioning lower-level causal mechanism."

In his Book Kagaku no Sekai to Kokoro no Tetsugaku, Michio Kobayashi features on Descartes’ theory of minds as “subjective-active consciousness”, and defends it against the physicalist movement of philosophy of mind. I try to show that Kobayashi’s method has a difficulty for defending the existence of our mind because Descartes didn’t allow the scientific investigation of our mental experience from outside. In addition, Cartesian theory of mind cannot appropriately grasp the significance of “other minds”. Instead of Cartesian view, I propose the “mind in general” view, in which minds are open to our world and exists in our communication.

Neil Levy argues that self-deceivers are not always culpable or responsible because (s)he suffer "identification problem" of their belief mechanism, so they cannnot control
theiw own beliefs. Against Levy's view, I point out that self-deceivers are so calm as to know which belief they ignore or distort in order to believe they want to. More, I propose that ,concerning responsibility, we must consider of some harms which self-deception brings about, "culpable ignorance" for example.

The motivationalism of self-deception, on which self-deception is a distortion of belief motivated by desire or emotion, etc. It denies analogy to deception by others, so doesn’t admit the existence of deceived belief p and deceiving belief not-p. Motivationalism needs to make clear why self-deception which come to an unwelcome belief.  For if self-deception occurs by believers’ desire and emotion, it is unreasonable for them to believe things they want to believe as a result of self-deception. Barnes gave an account in terms of anxiety-reduction, but Scott-Kakures argued against her view that it is unintelligible why the believers who want to reduce anxiety has to distort their own beliefs toward more anxious direction. He claimed the aim of twisted self-deception is avoiding the cost of mistakenly believing certain hypothesis. But both raise a new question. Although there are several method and opportunity for reducing anxiety or avoiding costly error, why believers need to twist ones own belief when they do have that belief? I cast a focus on the function of keeping mental balance as the important role of twisted self-deception, and claim that this view has several advantage of usefulness for proper decision-making, and of answering why self-deceivers do bias their beliefs of all when they believe the opposite.